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THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF FEDERALISM

Bruce LedewitY
Dr. Brewer-Carias has delivered a serious critique of the trend
toward centralization of political and governmental power under
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez that underscores both the
theoretical significance of federalism as a check against potential
government tyranny and highlights the long-standing autocratic
tendencies of President Chavez. In so doing, Dr. Brewer-Carias
reminds us that democratic constitutional theory is not an academic exercise, but often arises from the actual confrontation of
freedom with would-be, and actual, government oppression.
I wish in my response to Dr. Brewer-Carias' presentation also to
blend, as he does, the theoretical and the concrete in considering
the future of federalism. As Dr. Brewer-Carias shows, categories
of political structure like federalism cannot be considered in the
abstract. They have meaning only in particular applications.
My response proceeds in four parts. First, an account of the
traditional justifications of federalism in the United States. Second, an acknowledgment of federalism's historic role in the protection of democratic constitutionalism. Third, a question concerning
whether federalism is likely to maintain its place in constitutional
thinking, given the realities and challenges democracy is facing
today. Finally, consideration of federalism as an abstract political/
constitutional norm.
I.

FEDERALISM AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

Even if Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States Supreme
Court is mistaken in suggesting that power and legitimacy in the
United States do not flow from the undifferentiated "people of the
United States," but that the Constitution was formed by the sovereign acts of the people of each of the individual states,1 the fact
that such a sentiment was voiced by four of the nine Justices of
*
1.
ing).

Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995)(Thomas, J., dissent-
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the Supreme Court 2 demonstrates the deep commitment of [the]
United States [C]onstitution to the concept of federalism. Indeed,
some of the examples of centralization recently asserted by the
national government in Venezuela-such as central control over
the forms and procedures of governance in the sub-national
states-would plainly be unconstitutional in the United States.
Historically, federalism in the United States needed no theoretical justification. At the time the Constitution was adopted, any
widely perceived challenge to the autonomy of the states would
have doomed the proposed charter of government. At that time,
the states were sovereign in fact and dominant in political terms.
As late as 1861, Robert E. Lee is reputed to have said to the emissary of President Abraham Lincoln, as Lee rejected the proffered
command of union forces, that he could not fight against his country. By country, General Lee was referring not to the United
3
States, but to his native Virginia.
Nevertheless, though no theoretical justifications were necessary, given the political power wielded by the states, such justifications have been offered of what came to be known as "Our Federalism." The decentralization of governmental power was seen as
an important component of the Constitution's effort to create an
effective national government that would not, at the same time,
threaten individual liberty. The view in The Federalist Papersconsidered a fair representation of the nationalist viewpoint in the
United States at the time of the ratification struggle-was that
potential national tyranny could be prevented "both by limits upon
national legislative powers and also by maintaining viable state
'4
governments.
Federalism has been understood in U.S. history not only as a
bulwark of individual liberty, but also as a means of promoting
democracy. Legislation at the State and local levels promotes increased opportunity for citizen involvement in government decision-making and more responsive government as well.5 So in U.S.
political thought, federalism serves both liberty and democracy,
which is a viewpoint that Dr. Brewer-Carias shares.
2. Justice Thomas' dissent was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O'Connor.
3. Although I have heard this statement attributed to Lee on many occasions, I have
been unable to substantiate it in any of the classic sources on Lee's life. The remark may
well be apocryphal, but, even so, the remark is suggestive of a certain mindset with regard
to the States.
4.

CHOPER, ETAL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 (9th ed. 2001).

5.

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
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THE POTENCY OF FEDERALISM

There are numerous examples of political decentralization
achieving precisely the impact that this understanding of federalism suggests. A dramatic current example is that of Venezuela
itself, where, to speak more broadly than does Dr. Brewer-Carias,
President Chavez is engaging in a sort of "endless coup d'etat."
Not all of the forms of democracy have been eliminated in Venezuela, to be sure. But, through political centralization, both federalism and the separation of powers are being robbed of meaning.
President Chavez' apparent victory in the recent national referendum, though vigorously disputed, has only strengthened his democratic legitimacy around the world.6
All this goes to show that genuine democracy and popular government are not necessarily the same thing. As I wrote in a different context in 2003, "President Hugo Chavez.. .has ruled democratically, but dictatorially since 1998."7

Another example of the potency of federalism to promote democracy is the current political situation in the United States. At the
moment when these words are being written--October, 2004-the
Republican Party controls all three branches of the federal government.
The other major political party-the Democratic
Party-is able to sustain itself as a viable opposition political force
in part because of its continuing control of various branches of
government among the states.
Perhaps the most famous example of the importance of federalism-though a doomed example-was the continuing opposition
against Hitler waged by the Social Democratic Party government
in Prussia after the Nazi Party took control of the national executive and legislative branches of government in 1932. Hitler was
unable to consolidate Nazi control effectively until the autonomy
of the Sub-national governments in Germany was eliminated.
Thus, we see that there is a great deal of justification for the
praise of, and commitment to, federalism that is the foundation of
Dr. Brewer-Carias' paper. Nevertheless, no political principle can
be appreciated independently of context. And no political thinkers, even those as wise as the writers of The Federalist Papers,
6. In early September, the Bush administration dropped its support for Venezuela's
$250 loan request before the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, reportedly to signal its unhappiness with the manner in which the referendum was conducted.
7. Bruce Ledewitz, The Promiseof Democracy,32 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 407, 411 (2003).
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can be followed uncritically many years after the world they knew
has disappeared. Federalism must today be questioned as well as
praised.
III. QUESTIONING FEDERALISM
I wish to raise three questions about federalism that may alter
its political and constitutional significance for the future. These
questions concern the effectiveness of federalism in combating
tyranny, its relevance in meeting the most pressing challenges
that democratic governments face today, and federalism's unwitting role in promoting the increasing economic inequality in the
world that threatens the future of democracy itself.
The first question-the capacity of federalism to combat oppressive political regimes-is raised directly by Dr. Brewer-Carias'
paper. Simply put, despite the tradition of federalism in Venezuela, President Chavez seems to have had had little political difficulty in centralizing political and governmental power.
Nor is this story unique to Venezuela. In the United States,
long-standing principles of decentralized governmental power
were simply swept away by the public demand for central government action in light of the Depression in the 1930's. Nor, after
the emergency passed, did the states return to anything like their
former prominence. Even the Republican Party in the United
States, though to champion the rights of the states, has in recent
years imposed, or sought to insert, federal norms on traditionally
State concerns, like the legal alcohol drinking age, highway speed
limits and State criminal parole policies. Today, for partisan political reasons, the Republican Party seeks a national solution to
the issue of homosexual marriage, another field of traditional local
control.
These instances suggest that federal political structures do not
endure very well in the face of popular demands in democratic
systems. When the people want governmental action of a certain
kind, politicians at the national level, whatever their ideology toward federalism, are very likely to respond with central government solutions.
The second question is whether sub-national governments can
realistically play a role in solving the most significant problems
facing nations in the world today. Though obviously an inadequate recitation, I will label these problems as worldwide terrorism, the deteriorating planetary environment and globalism,
which signifies a series of issues, including worldwide corporate
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power as well as north/south matters of development and economic justice.
In terms of foreign-based terrorism, it is generally conceded that
national governments must control national borders, so in that
context the issue of federalism does not arise. But in terms of terrorism occurring internally from whatever source, whether domestic or foreign, the situation is quite otherwise. It has been argued
vigorously in the United States, for example, that, aside from taxing and spending powers, the central government lacks a regulatory police power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held,
in cases acknowledged as reinvigorating federalism, that Congress
may not regulate weapons in schools8 or violence against women 9
and has also intimated that Congress may not regulate the crime
of ordinary arson.10
If these holdings were taken seriously, and their consistent application is in doubt", they might cripple central government efforts to combat terrorism occurring within the United States. For
example, terrorists in other countries have already used violence
against women to accomplish their political and religious goals.
Were this to occur in the United States, the Morrison case would
simply have to be overruled, either expressly or impliedly, in order
for Congress to respond effectively. But, to acknowledge the incapacity of the states to fight terrorism without central government
leadership and control is to acknowledge that there really is, and
must be, a central government police power. Yet, the acceptance
of such a national police power would be taken among many in the
United States to be a direct contradiction of federalism.
The same point can be made with regard to the environmental
challenges that face humankind in the 21st century. It is true that
efforts by sub-national governments to fight global warmingsuch as California's recently proposed auto emission standards or
New Jersey's agreement with the Netherlands [to cooperate on
global warming abatement issues] 12can represent important ex8. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (interpreting federal arson statute so as
not to reach owner occupied structures not used for commercial purposes).
11. Why, for example, should the central government be permitted to sanction ordinary
crime against abortion clinics but not violence in schools? Cf N.O.W. v. Scheidler, 510
U.S. 249 (1994) (upholding the use of federal RICO statute against anti-abortion protestors
using tactics that violate state law to attempt to close abortion clinics).
12. See Kirk Junker, Conventional Wisdom, De-Emption and Uncooperative Federalism in International Environmental Agreements,[2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 93, 110-114 (2004-2005)].
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periments in the best tradition of federalism. 13 Yet, in the end,
only comprehensive, national legislation can deal with environmental systems, which are by their nature systemic. When the
United States Supreme Court pretends that comprehensive systems can be divided into fragmented and unrelated parts, in the
name of federalism, the Court is ignoring simple science. Scientifically speaking, there is no such thing, for example, as intrastate water. 14 All such water has moved across state borders in
the past and, of course, will do so again in the future. While that
fact does not determine what level of government should regulate
such bodies of water, it should inform the vocabulary of such determinations.
The final illustration of the doubtful relevance of federalism in
the future is globalization-the interrelated issues raised by a rapidly integrating world economy. The challenges of globalization
cannot be met at the sub-national level. This is the case whether
one applauds globalization or harbors skepticism towards it. Positively speaking, major international lenders often mandate economic reforms at the nation state level. More negatively, international corporations sometimes play one sub-national government
off another in their efforts to find the most advantageous terms for
investment. But to allow corporations to spark a "race to the bottom" in terms of corporate regulation is to endanger national
standards protecting labor, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples.
The substantial likelihood that sub-national governments will
find it difficult to respond effectively to pressing social, economic
and political issues such as these undermines any likely reliance
on federalism in democratic governmental organization. For the
day has passed in democratic nations when the people would accept a situation like that described in the Kansas v. Coloradocase
in 190715 in which the Supreme Court stated that though the reclamation of arid lands in the United States was a worthy goal, and
though the states collectively might be inadequate to accomplish
this goal, there was simply no authority in the national government to carry out this function. Democracy requires that some
13. See New York State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting)(State can serve as a laboratory).
14. Cf Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (interpreting the federal Clean Water Act as not regulating
"nonnavigable, isolated intrastate waters" thus avoiding "significant constitutional and
federalism questions").
15. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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level of government be effective in addressing social needs. Democracy will fall prey to dictatorship should democratic government prove institutionally incapable of doing so. This reality may
limit the future importance of federalism.
While federal solutions to the above issues might prove ineffective, the final question I wish to raise about federalism concerns
not its ineffectiveness but its potential negative impact on the
growing income inequality in the world. The issue of income inequality in the world is significant both politically and religiously.
Politically, poverty and the gap between rich and poor represent a
real threat to democracy. When Alexis de Tocqueville came to the
United States in 1830, he was quick to see that the basis for democracy was a fundamental social and economic equality in society. He expected such equality to spread in the world and with it,
democracy. In these expectations, he proved largely correct for a
long time, for throughout the 2 0 th century mature economies in
the world produced a large and growing middle class that served
as the backbone of democracy in many nations.
Unfortunately, and for reasons that are unclear, the trend in
the United States and other countries toward income equality began to reverse itself after World War II. Slowly but inexorably,
the percentage share of national wealth at the top of the income
ladder grew. I cannot do justice to such an important and complex
trend in a few sentences, but as a representative example, a 2002
United States Census Report showed the top 20% of U.S. house16
holds earning almost 50% of the aggregate national income.
This disparity resulted from a slowly growing inequality over a
fifty year period.1 7 It is not clear that democracy can survive in
the context of deep division between the haves and the have-nots.
The other reason to raise the issue of income inequality is the
ethical/religious requirement of economic justice. The Torah and
the Gospel are clear that the needs of the poor must always assume priority when there is discussion of large scale social organization.
Again, time and space do not permit discussion of the relationship of political decentralization to poverty and to general income
distribution in society. Certainly federalism can serve to embed
local elites in a protected sanctuary immune from political interference. On the other hand, there are also historical exceptions to
16.

See

INCOME
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UNITED

http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-221.pdf, Table, A-3.
17. A gradual increase in percentage from 43.8% to 49.7%.
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2002,
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that tendency. The Indian sub-national State of Kerala, for example, has been an unusual, successful instance of democratic and
egalitarian Communist government.1 8 The point is that federalism cannot be praised without acknowledgment of its potential
negative aspects.
Poverty and income inequality present an even more pressing
difficulty for democracy in Latin America than in the United
States. President Chavez has seized on this problem by exploiting
the divisions between rich and poor in Venezuela in his attempts
to consolidate political power.
It may be that a large degree of social and economic equality in
a democracy must exist before federalism can be viewed as a viable political option. If that should turn out to be the case, then
attention will have to be paid to questions of economic justice in
society before the issue of federalism can be addressed.
A PoliticalFuturefor Federalism?

IV

A dissenting view has emerged in the United States Supreme
Court cases that have reinvigorated federalism in the United
States. According to this dissenting view, federalism can and
should be maintained through political mechanisms rather than
through judicial/constitutional means. 19
This view suffers from the obvious flaw that it relies on central
government authorities to protect federalism when those officials'
own interests may be said to lie in increased central political
power. In addition, in a system like that of the United States,
with its extreme reliance on judicial review, political enforcement
of constitutional norms is widely regarded as no enforcement at
all. 20 Even these dissenting Justices in the Supreme Court could
not bring themselves to assert that the courts should have no role
in the enforcement of federalism.
Nevertheless, the very effort waged by Dr. Brewer-Carias demonstrates that such political checks can be effective. For, in the
Venezuelan situation, the opposition to centralization of power has
been largely political in nature. And though one cannot say that

18.

For an account, see Bill McKibben, HOPE, HUMAN AND WILD: TRUE STORIES OF

LLIVING LIGHTLY ON EARTH 117 (1995).

19. Morrison, supra note 9, at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress, not the courts,
must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance").
20. But see Larry Kramer, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
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his warnings have been entirely heeded, they certainly have not
been ineffective.
In the end, political oppression may not be a matter of the structure of government. And opposition to political oppression may
call not for institutional change, but political and personal courage. We see in Venezuela, and it has been the case in all democracies, that the maintenance of democratic government, though it
may be aided by certain political structures, always in the end requires the voices of brave individuals who attempt to rouse the
people to the danger confronting their liberties. Dr. BrewerCarias is an inspiring example of such commitment.

